Monetary Economics · Lecture 10 of 15

The Zero Lower Bound and Unconventional Policy

Part III · Extensions

Level: Graduate | Field: Monetary Economics

Learning objectives

Analyse liquidity traps in the New Keynesian model, understand why the lower bound makes recessions deeper, and evaluate forward guidance, quantitative easing, negative rates and fiscal policy at the lower bound. Explain the forward-guidance puzzle and its resolutions.

1. The effective lower bound

Because cash pays a zero nominal return, the nominal interest rate cannot fall much below zero: \(i_t\ge i_{\text{ELB}}\approx0\). The bound binds when the natural real rate becomes very negative, for instance after a financial crisis or a collapse in demand. U.S. policy rates were at the bound in 2008–2015 and 2020–2022; the euro area, Japan, Switzerland and Sweden pushed policy rates slightly below zero. The secular decline in the neutral real rate (Lecture 7) makes the bound bind more often.

2. A liquidity trap in the New Keynesian model

Following Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), suppose the natural rate falls to \(r^n_L<0\) and stays there with probability \(\mu\) each period, returning permanently to \(r^*>0\) with probability \(1-\mu\). After the shock ends, policy delivers \(\pi=\tilde y=0\). While the shock lasts, \(i=0\) and the equilibrium is constant:

\[ \tilde y_L=\mu\tilde y_L+\tfrac1\sigma(\mu\pi_L+r^n_L),\qquad \pi_L=\beta\mu\pi_L+\kappa\tilde y_L , \]

which gives

\[ \tilde y_L=\frac{r^n_L/\sigma}{(1-\mu)-\dfrac{\mu\kappa}{\sigma(1-\beta\mu)}},\qquad \pi_L=\frac{\kappa}{1-\beta\mu}\tilde y_L . \]

The denominator is positive but can be small: falling output lowers inflation, which raises the real rate, which lowers output further. Small changes in persistence or price flexibility generate very large recessions — a deflationary spiral. Paradoxically, more price flexibility (a larger \(\kappa\)) makes things worse (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012). Fiscal multipliers are large at the bound because government spending raises expected inflation and lowers real rates (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2011).

3. Forward guidance

The optimal commitment policy keeps rates at zero after the natural rate recovers and lets inflation overshoot. The promise raises expected inflation and output in the trap, lowering real rates today (Krugman, 1998; Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). The policy is time inconsistent: when the trap ends, the central bank would prefer to raise rates. Central banks used Delphic guidance (forecasts of future policy) and Odyssean guidance (commitments), with calendar-based and threshold-based formulations (Campbell et al., 2012).

4. The forward-guidance puzzle

In the standard model, iterating the Euler equation forward gives \(\tilde y_t=-\frac1\sigma\sum_{k\ge0}E_t r_{t+k}\): a one-time cut in the real rate at any horizon \(T\) raises output today by the same amount, and through the Phillips curve the effect on today's inflation grows with \(T\). Promises about the distant future are implausibly powerful (Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson, 2012). Resolutions include:

  • Discounted Euler equations from incomplete markets and borrowing constraints, \(\tilde y_t=ME_t\tilde y_{t+1}-\frac1\sigma r_t\) with \(M<1\) (McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson, 2016);
  • Bounded rationality and cognitive discounting (Gabaix, 2020);
  • Finite planning horizons and level-\(k\) thinking (Woodford, 2019; Farhi and Werning, 2019);
  • Imperfect credibility of promises.

5. Quantitative easing and balance-sheet policy

Large-scale asset purchases replace long-term bonds held by the private sector with reserves. In a frictionless world this is irrelevant (Wallace, 1981). With segmented markets or preferred habitats (Vayanos and Vila, 2021), purchases lower term premia; with constrained intermediaries (Gertler and Karadi, 2011), purchases of private assets ease credit spreads. Purchases also signal that rates will stay low (Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014). Event studies of the 2008–09 programmes find declines in 10-year yields of tens of basis points per programme (Gagnon et al., 2011), with smaller effects later. In 2022 the Fed began quantitative tightening, shrinking its balance sheet.

6. Negative rates and other tools

Negative policy rates in Europe and Japan (2014–2024) lowered market rates, but pass-through to deposit rates is limited, which may squeeze bank margins and lending (the "reversal rate", Brunnermeier and Koby, 2018). Other options include yield-curve control (Bank of Japan, 2016–2024; Reserve Bank of Australia, 2020–21), a higher inflation target (Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia and Mauro, 2010) and make-up strategies such as price-level targeting (Lecture 7).

7. Computation

The lower bound makes the model nonlinear. Dynare handles occasionally binding constraints with the OccBin toolkit (Guerrieri and Iacoviello, 2015), using the occbin_constraints block and occbin_solver, and solves deterministic paths with perfect_foresight_setup and perfect_foresight_solver. The two-state model of Section 2 and the perfect-foresight experiments of Section 4 have closed forms and are solved directly in MATLAB in the exercises.

Problem set

  1. Derive the liquidity-trap solution of Section 2 and the condition for a unique bounded equilibrium.
  2. Explain why greater price flexibility deepens the recession at the lower bound.
  3. Show that with the standard Euler equation, the effect of a promised real-rate cut on today's output is independent of the horizon.
  4. Derive the discounted Euler equation in a simple model with idiosyncratic income risk and a borrowing constraint (sketch).
  5. Compare the transmission channels of QE in the preferred-habitat model and in the Gertler–Karadi model.

Coding exercises

These exercises use MATLAB and Dynare only. Download the course data files and helper functions into your working folder. Every data series is real: U.S. quarterly and monthly macro data (FRED-QD / FRED-MD, 1959–2025), published monetary-policy shock series (Romer–Romer, Jarociński–Karadi, Bu–Rogers–Wu, Nakamura–Steinsson), World Bank CPI inflation for 190+ countries, and the KRW/USD exchange rate. Dynare models are .mod files run with dynare file noclearall (Dynare 6). Try the starter files first, then open the solution. Every printed result was produced by running the solution files as shown: the .mod files were processed by the Dynare preprocessor and solved at first order, and the MATLAB code was run in GNU Octave.

Exercise 10.1 — A liquidity trap and the value of forward guidance

Data: Model calibration: \(\beta=0.99,\ \sigma=1,\ \kappa=0.02\); the natural rate falls to −1% a quarter and stays there with probability \(\mu=0.8\) each quarter.

Follow Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). The natural real rate is \(r^n_L<0\) while the trap lasts and returns to \(r^*=1/\beta-1\) with probability \(1-\mu\) each quarter, after which policy achieves \(\pi=\tilde y=0\). While the trap lasts \(i=0\).

  1. Show that in the trap \(\tilde y_L=\frac{r^n_L/\sigma}{(1-\mu)-\mu\kappa/[\sigma(1-\beta\mu)]}\) and \(\pi_L=\kappa\tilde y_L/(1-\beta\mu)\), and compute them.
  2. Forward guidance: the central bank promises to keep \(i=0\) for one extra quarter after the natural rate recovers. In that exit quarter \(\tilde y_E=r^*/\sigma\) and \(\pi_E=\kappa\tilde y_E\). Recompute the trap outcomes.
  3. How much of the recession does one quarter of forward guidance prevent? Why is the effect so large?

File ex10_1.m

beta = 0.99; sigma = 1; kappa = 0.02; mu = 0.8; rL = -0.01; rstar = 1 / beta - 1;
% TODO: solve the two linear equations for (x_L, pi_L), first with x_E = pi_E = 0, then with forward guidance
Solution, output and discussion

File ex10_1.m

beta = 0.99; sigma = 1; kappa = 0.02; mu = 0.8; rL = -0.01; rstar = 1 / beta - 1;
% in the trap (i = 0):  x_L = mu x_L + (1-mu) x_E + (1/sigma)(mu pi_L + (1-mu) pi_E + rL)
%                       pi_L = kappa x_L + beta (mu pi_L + (1-mu) pi_E)
A = [1 - mu, -mu / sigma; -kappa, 1 - beta * mu];
fprintf('                         output gap (%%)   inflation (%%, annualised)\n');
for fg = [0 1]
  xE = fg * rstar / sigma; piE = kappa * xE;                % exit quarter with i = 0 instead of r*
  rhs = [(1 - mu) * xE + ((1 - mu) * piE + rL) / sigma; beta * (1 - mu) * piE];
  sol = A \ rhs;
  if fg == 0, nm = 'no forward guidance  '; base = sol; else, nm = '1 qtr of guidance    '; end
  fprintf('%s      %7.2f            %7.2f\n', nm, 100 * sol(1), 400 * sol(2));
end
fprintf('expected trap length: %.1f quarters; guidance removes %.0f%% of the output loss\n', 1 / (1 - mu), ...
        100 * (1 - sol(1) / base(1)));

Output:

output gap (%)   inflation (%, annualised)
no forward guidance          -8.13              -3.13
1 qtr of guidance            -6.33              -2.36
expected trap length: 5.0 quarters; guidance removes 22% of the output loss

With a natural rate of −4% a year and an expected trap of five quarters, the zero bound turns a moderate shock into a deep recession with deflation. Falling inflation raises the real rate when it should fall, which lowers output, which lowers inflation further. This feedback is why the denominator can approach zero (a "deflationary spiral"). A promise to hold the rate at zero for a single additional quarter, once the shock is over, raises expected output and inflation in every trap state; higher expected inflation lowers today's real rate, and the improvement compounds through the same loop. In this calibration that single quarter removes about a fifth of the output loss. The catch is credibility: when the trap ends, the central bank is tempted to renege (Lecture 6).

Exercise 10.2 — The forward-guidance puzzle

Data: Model calibration: \(\sigma=1\), \(\kappa=0.1717\), \(\beta=0.99\).

Under perfect foresight, suppose the central bank announces at \(t=0\) that the real rate will be 25 bp lower in quarter \(T\) only. With the standard Euler equation \(\tilde y_t=\tilde y_{t+1}-\sigma^{-1}r_t\) and Phillips curve \(\pi_t=\beta\pi_{t+1}+\kappa\tilde y_t\), solve backwards from \(\tilde y=\pi=0\) after \(T\).

  1. Compute \(\tilde y_0\) and \(\pi_0\) for \(T\in\{0,4,8,20,40\}\).
  2. Repeat with the "discounted" Euler equation of McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2016), \(\tilde y_t=M\tilde y_{t+1}-\sigma^{-1}r_t\) with \(M=0.97\).
  3. Why does the standard model imply that distant promises are so powerful? What resolves the puzzle?

File ex10_2.m

sigma = 1; kappa = 0.1717; beta = 0.99; dr = -0.25;
% TODO: for each T and M in {1, 0.97}: backward recursion over t = T, T-1, ..., 0
Solution, output and discussion

File ex10_2.m

sigma = 1; kappa = 0.1717; beta = 0.99; dr = -0.25;
fprintf('   T    standard Euler: x0    pi0 (ann.)   |   discounted Euler (M = 0.97): x0   pi0 (ann.)\n');
for T = [0 4 8 20 40]
  out = zeros(1, 4);
  for j = 1:2
    M = 1 - 0.03 * (j == 2); x = 0; p = 0;
    for t = T:-1:0
      r = dr * (t == T);
      x = M * x - r / sigma; p = beta * p + kappa * x;
    end
    out(2*j-1:2*j) = [x 4 * p];
  end
  fprintf('%4d        %6.3f      %7.3f      |                    %6.3f      %7.3f\n', T, out);
end

Output:

T    standard Euler: x0    pi0 (ann.)   |   discounted Euler (M = 0.97): x0   pi0 (ann.)
 0         0.250        0.172      |                     0.250        0.172
 4         0.250        0.842      |                     0.221        0.792
 8         0.250        1.485      |                     0.196        1.316
20         0.250        3.267      |                     0.136        2.423
40         0.250        5.799      |                     0.074        3.223

With the standard Euler equation the output gap today rises by the same 0.25% whatever the horizon of the promise, because today's output depends on the sum of all future real rates. Inflation today rises more the more distant the promise, because the higher output path accumulates in the forward-looking Phillips curve: a promise ten years out has a far larger effect on today's inflation than an immediate cut. That is the forward-guidance puzzle (Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson, 2012). With the discounted Euler equation, which arises with incomplete markets and borrowing constraints (McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson, 2016) or bounded rationality, the effect of distant promises dies out. Heterogeneous-agent models (Lecture 12) give a microfoundation.

Further reading

  • Eggertsson, G. and M. Woodford (2003), "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
  • Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum and S. Rebelo (2011), "When Is the Government Spending Multiplier Large?" Journal of Political Economy.
  • McKay, A., E. Nakamura and J. Steinsson (2016), "The Power of Forward Guidance Revisited," American Economic Review.
  • Bernanke, B. (2020), "The New Tools of Monetary Policy," American Economic Review.
  • Guerrieri, L. and M. Iacoviello (2015), "OccBin: A Toolkit for Solving Dynamic Models with Occasionally Binding Constraints Easily," Journal of Monetary Economics.